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Abstract 
This thesis studies the choice of floatation method using a dataset based on 703 public offerings in 
Sweden between 2006 and 2017. A logistic model is utilised to study the determinants of underwriting, an 
ordinary least square model to estimate the direct cost of floatation, and the cost of underwriting is 
estimated using the Heckman sample selection model. The results are generally aligned with existing 
research and suggest that underwriters are providers of signalling in equity offerings, but are for our 
sample to be considered imperfect in providing certification. In contrast to existing beliefs of shareholder 
takeup, the likelihood of underwriting is increasing in expected shareholder takeup from subscription 
precommitments. Our explanation for this is bilateral. On the one side, we argue that risk averse firms can 
ensure successful offerings by using a combination of subscription precommitments and underwriting. On 
the other side, we reason that high subscription precommitments indicate concentrations of large 
shareholders. Accordingly, we propose that underwriting in these equity offerings may be a result of 
agency problems between shareholders. Furthermore, a rights issue paradox is insinuated in the Swedish 
equity market. However, we limit our inference to mere indications as opposed to definite conclusions, 
and emphasise that an estimation of the indirect costs is needed to assert the presence of such paradox. 
Finally, we find that there are economies of scale of underwriting and that the cost of underwriting is 
decreasing in the insured share in the equity offering.  
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2 Glossary 
Equity offering/Equity issue – Issuing common stock. 
 
Floatation method – Issuing equity with or without underwriting. 
 
Fully underwritten/Firm committed underwriting – A floatation method prevalent in the 
U.S. in which a financial advisor buys all new issued shares in an offering.  
 
Insured rights – A rights issue involving underwriting in a standby agreement.  
 
Rights issue – A seasoned equity offering including right of priority to existing shareholders. 
 
Standby agreement/Standby underwriting – An equity offering insurance in which an 
underwriter guarantees to buy all non-sold or non-subscribed shares. 
 
Underwriter – A party that insures an offering, standby agreement, or buys a new issue in full, 
fully underwritten/firm committed underwriting. 
 
Uninsured rights - A rights issue lacking underwriting. 
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3 Introduction 
Despite being more expensive than uninsured rights issues, firms predominantly prefer to issue equity 
with insurance using underwriting (Smith, 1977; Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Bohren et al, 1997; and 
Ginglinger et al., 2013). In the U.S., the most common method of floatation, issuing common stock with 
or without underwriting, is through firm committed underwriting (Eckbo, 2008; Lai et al, 2000). Using this 
floatation method, the financial intermediary initially buys all issued stock and subsequently sells the stock 
on the open market. However, the prevalence of this method, and other floatation methods involving 
underwriting, are not met without criticism. It is argued that firms are able to ensure full subscription in 
rights issues by offering appropriate discounts, which corresponds to a lower incurred cost than the direct 
cost of using underwriting. Therefore, utilising underwriting despite incurred higher costs is regarded as 
contradictory to wealth maximization. By this rationale, a rights issue paradox is said to be present across 
various domestic equity markets. The paradox is explained from perspectives of information asymmetries 
and adverse selection, as well as factors influencing the market performance of stock following floatation, 
and sometimes agency problems (Smith, 1977; Parson and Raviv, 1985; Hansen, 1989; Henkel and 
Schwartz, 1986; etc.). 
 
On average, the Swedish equity market saw 70 stock offerings, initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs), per annum between late 2006 and early 2017, raising more than SEK 200 billion 2 
in gross proceeds during the period. Firms issuing common stock on the Swedish equity market usually 
float shares uninsured or by employing standby agreement underwriting. Standby agreements are present 
in approximately 60 per cent of all new equity issues in Sweden and are offered in order to insure success 
of an equity issue. In standby arrangements, the underwriter commits to buying any shares unsold to 
existing shareholders or the public, thus mitigating risks of offering failure. In contrast to other markets, 
standby agreements in Sweden are not primarily solutions provided by underwriters in the form of 
financial intermediaries, such as investment banks, but are instead entered into between individual 
investors and the firm3. Moreover, the party employed as underwriter is compensated through a fee, 
usually some fixed per cent of the value of the insured amount of stock, which makes the contract similar 
to selling a put option. Likewise, underwriters are taxed accordingly (Swedish Tax Agency, 2017). Since 
alternatives to underwriting exist, and due to the unresolved issue of the rights issue paradox, Sweden’s 
equity market serves as an interesting setting for studying determinants affecting the choice of floatation 
method. 
 
                                                      
2 Not adjusted for inflation. 
3 The umbrella term for this arrangement is in Swedish called “garantiåtaganden” and the term for the party 
providing the underwriter is called “garant”. 
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In this thesis, we draw our empirical findings based on a uniquely extensive dataset and models inspired 
by existing research. The aim of this thesis is to shed light upon the floatation choice made by public firms 
listed on Swedish stock exchanges and to observe factors affecting the direct costs of floatation and 
underwriting, thus improving the understanding of firms’ decision making when issuing equity. We first 
study the determinants of standby agreements by using a logistic model. Second, we estimate an ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression studying the cost of floating, in which standby agreements are serving as a 
dummy variable to test underwriting affects the direct cost of floatation positively. Thirdly, we estimate 
Heckmans’s (1979) sample selection model testing the cost of standby agreements as a share of the gross 
proceeds in order to study factors affecting the cost of standby agreements. For our studies, we utilise a 
manually obtained dataset ranging from late 2006 to early 2017, covering all4 new equity issues on Swedish 
stock exchanges. In order to use coherent assumptions affecting the choice of floatation methods and 
costs thereof, that are observable and comparable across all firms in the dataset, we utilise factors related 
to the equity issue itself. Additionally, we examine exogenous parameters of interest, such as economic 
sentiment, effects on the conditions. Our research therefore differ and complement a range of existing 
studies with regards to the explanatory factors in underwriting (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Bohren et al, 
1997; Ginglinger et al, 2013).  
 
In brief, our results indicate positive relationships between subscription precommitments, being listed on 
the primary exchange, issuing units, and underwriting. Accordingly, a contrast between findings in existing 
literature with regards to the perceived effects of shareholder takeup and issuing uninsured rights is 
observed. Moreover, there is a negative relationship between using lockup commitments, economic 
sentiment, and underwriting. In our OLS model, results are overall aligned with the existing literature and 
indicate the existence of a rights issue paradox on the Swedish equity market. Conclusively, our third 
model suggests that there exists economies of scale in underwriting and that existing subscription 
precommitments will decrease the cost of underwriting. Our findings contribute to the field of equity 
offerings and floatation methods, with particular implications to the standby decision and the rights issue 
paradox, and are to the best of our knowledge, unique for the Swedish setting. The thesis extends on the 
existing literature by using a uniquely comprehensive data set for Swedish equity offerings in terms of time 
relevance and quantity of observations. With additional efforts into developing the dataset, future research 
could focus on the shareholder dispersion of companies and the option to engage in standbys as well as 
other firm specific parameters such as industry classification.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: In the next section, we present the literature review 
and thesis background; Subsequently, we present the method including a section on the data collection as 
well as three subsections covering the three studies conducted; Lastly, a conclusion to the study is 
                                                      
4 All prospectuses approved by the Swedish FSA. 
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presented. In addition, we provide a last section with suggestions for future research based on our findings 
in the paper. 
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4 Literature review and thesis background 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the behaviour of firms raising capital through equity issuance with 
particular emphasis on the floatation method and the relationships with financial intermediaries and 
investors. Here, the main focus is on the firms’ employment of underwriters, which in the context of this 
thesis serve to be those parties that engage in insuring an equity offering, in part or in full. Underwriters of 
firms’ equity offerings can accordingly be banks, other firms, or individuals. In the following section, we 
conduct a literature review of equity offerings and floatation methods. The literature review section is 
divided into two subsections, first covering literature relevant to underwriting in equity offerings and the 
second covering the most prominent literature regarding the choice of floatation. The section serves to 
provide a robust theoretical foundation for the development of this thesis. We then commence to provide 
a background for conducting this thesis with regards to the Swedish equity market setting. 
4.1 Underwriting and equity offerings 
Research concerned with firms’ access to equity finance is, among other theories, often based upon 
adverse selection, its mitigation, and its effect on stock prices. In the role of equity offerings, Myers and 
Majluf’s seminal 1984 article has served as an academic cornerstone, which theoretical mechanism is 
frequently used to explain phenomena in equity issuance, i.e. that firms may pass on issuing equity if 
information asymmetries between managers and shareholders are too large. Information asymmetries are 
expected to cause misevaluation of stock and consequently lead to issues such as adverse selection, hence 
requiring mitigation (Healy and Palepu, 2001). One such way to mitigate information asymmetries is 
arguably through the use of underwriters. The theoretical role of the underwriters in equity offerings, in 
the form of financial institutions or investment banks, can be explained in a multitude of ways. In practise, 
underwriters’ roles are to gather information of investor interest, which is subsequently translated in to the 
valuation practises previous to the offering, according to Benveniste and Sprindt (1989). As stated 
previously, underwriters are also argued to possess a role in mitigating adverse selection and information 
asymmetries in offerings, thus aiding the firm in successfully raising capital (Booth and Smith, 1986). The 
underwriter can through its reputation certify the quality of the underwritten firm, and thus attract 
potential investors through improved information sharing (Booth and Smith, 1986). Consequently, the 
certification of underwriters exists as long as there are reputational costs incurred with underwriting low 
quality stock (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). 
 
The role of the underwriter can be studied in both initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs). In U.S. firm commitments, IPO and SEO underwriters are compensated through a 
spread or a fee. The underwriter buys the shares from the issuing firm at a discounted price, lower than 
the expected market price, and can subsequently sell the shares at a higher price to institutional investors 
and the public (Chen and Ritter, 2000). Moreover, compensation is also provided to investors in new 
issues. Investors in IPOs are typically rewarded through superior returns on the initial trading of the 
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shares, known as underpricing, or first-day returns (Rock, 1986). Observing this phenomenon in 
American IPOs, Ritter and Welch (2002) find that, on average, the first-day return in IPOs between 1980 
and 2001 was 18.8 per cent and that IPOs during the Internet bubble during 1999 and 2000 generated an 
average first-day return of 65 per cent. In the Nordic stock markets, Westerholm (2006) found that first 
day returns on average are 7 per cent but are conditional on hot and cold markets, such as the internet 
bubble which drove returns higher. In theory, models of asymmetric information, among other corporate 
finance frameworks, are put forward to explain such behaviour of underpricing. However, there is little 
evidence that one model or theoretical interpretation should be dominant in explaining abnormally high 
first day returns (Ritter and Welch, 2002). 
 
Nevertheless, investing in new issues is not a perfect investment opportunity for investors. Firms engaging 
in SEOs, as well as IPOs, serve as poor long-run investments and experience worse long-run performance 
than peers that for the same period did not offer equity (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-
Graves, 1995). Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) argue that the underperformance can be explained by 
managers of the issuing firms exploiting opportunities of temporary overvaluation of the stock. 
Accordingly, new stock is issued when prices are expected to fall, thus resulting in poor long-run 
performance. Market timing as a cause for new issues is supported by Loughran and Ritter (1995), who in 
addition explain IPO underperformance as investors systematically misvaluating new stock due to blind 
optimism resulting in inflated prices. 
4.2 Choice of floatation method and the rights issue paradox 
In equity issues, firms are provided with a floatation choice of either offering equity by means of selling 
the whole issue to the underwriter, using insured rights, or uninsured rights (Eckbo and Masulis, 
1992).  The choice of floatation method subsequently conditions the underwriting. In American common 
stock offerings, equity issues are almost exclusively floated using firm committed underwriting, meaning 
that an underwriter buys all shares from the issuing firm and subsequently sells and allocates the shares on 
the market (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). Rights with standby agreements, or insured rights, imply that the 
underwriter, i.e. the investment bank distributing newly issued shares, is responsible for selling all shares 
and reaching full commitment of existing and new shareholders. If the underwriter does not succeed in 
selling all issued shares, it has to buy the shares from the issuing firms and try to sell the shares on the 
market subsequent to the issue. Uninsured rights, imply issuing short-lived warrants to existing 
shareholders, through which the shareholders have the choice to subscribe to new shares offered. In this 
floatation method, no underwriter is utilised5. The amount of rights received per shareholder is often 
delivered on a pro rata basis, relative to the amount already held by the shareholder (Eckbo and Masulis, 
1992). Historically, U.S. firms issued stock using either uninsured rights but by 1981, firm committed 
underwriting made up more than 95 per cent of equity issues (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992).  
                                                      
5 Although, a financial advisor leading the issue is most often employed. 
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The underwriting used differs across domestic equity markets internationally. Similar to the U.S., firms in 
the U.K. have a preference for firm committed underwriting (Lai et al, 2000), while in other European 
domestic equity markets, uninsured rights issues and standby agreements are most prevalent in equity 
offerings (Bohren et al, 1997). In Norway, standby underwriting has become the most dominant form of 
floatation method since the 1980’s and made up 61 per cent of all common stock offerings by 1993, while 
the rest was made up by uninsured rights (Bohren et al, 1997). Studying Swedish equity markets, Cronqvist 
and Nilsson (2005) found in their sample of 160 rights offerings during 1986 to 1999 that the majority 107 
of the issues were unaccompanied by an underwriter while the remaining 53 were accompanied by standby 
underwriters. 
 
The choice of floatation method was academically popularised after Smith (1977) first found that 
companies had a preference for floating shares by employing an underwriter rather than issuing uninsured 
rights. Since, uninsured rights issues are argued to imply significantly less direct floatation costs, which has 
since been supported by a range of literature (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992, Bohren et al, 1997), using firm 
committed underwriting should lead to less net issue benefits to the firm. Because, it is argued that the 
rights issuer can ensure successful offerings by adjusting the subscription price with a discount deep 
enough discount to attract full subscription from existing shareholders, firms would maximize net issue 
benefits from issuing uninsured rights rather than using underwriting. Divergent to this logic, Smith finds 
that underwriters are employed in over 90 per cent of offerings during the observed period 1971 and 1975 
and that firm committed underwriting are more common than both standby offerings and rights issues, 
despite the two latter being associated with lower direct floatation costs. This academic puzzle is 
subsequently labelled the rights issue paradox. Since wealth-maximizing objectives do not explain the 
choice of floatation methods, Smith argues that agency problems do. Smith sets forth two hypotheses 
regarding agency problems. Firstly, that management and board of directors benefit privately from using 
underwriters, benefits that other shareholders are not receiving. Managers and board of directors may also 
receive benefits through wining and dining with underwriters, and receive bribe-like treatment for 
underwriting. Herman (1981) postulates that this is aligned with the possibly disproportionate presence of 
financial professionals on non-financial company boards in U.S. public companies, which could lead to 
excessive inclinations of underwriting in these firms’ equity offerings. Secondly, Smith (1977) argues that 
the cost for employing underwriters is lower than the cost for shareholders to monitor management in the 
decision of choosing the wealth maximizing floatation method. Therefore, shareholders and firms are 
indifferent to employing firm committed underwriting or to choosing uninsured rights issues.  
 
Further studies has been concerned with explaining the floatation method through other parameters. 
Hansen and Pinkerton (1982) explain the paradox through shareholder characteristics of the firm issuing 
equity. The rights issue paradox is argued to be a result of comparative costs associated with each form of 
equity financing. Uninsured rights offerings come at lower costs when the firms has a central shareholder 
 10 
that holds a large amount of stock, to which a certain amount is guaranteed to be sold, and oppositely, 
underwriting is more beneficial when no such shareholder is present. Disputing this, Smith and Dhatt 
(1984) argue that Hansen and Pinkerton’s empirical model is too sensitive in the functional form to 
provide coherent conclusions to the paradox. 
 
Parsons and Raviv (1985) argue that firm commitment underwritten equity offerings are preferred to 
rights issues due to underwritten equity offerings possessing superior benefits in terms of price 
movements of the stock. The underwriter can initially sell stock to those investors holding new issues in 
high regard, those buying the stock at high valuation. If needed, the underwriter can sell the stock at a 
lower valuation if the issue should attract lower interest in the market.  Rights offers are argued to lack this 
important aspect, serving as an explanation why firms have a preference for firm committed underwriting 
in stock issues. 
 
Moreover, Hansen (1989) suggests that the price stability offered by underwriters comes at a lower 
transaction costs than what is incurred on investors in an uninsured rights issue. Thus, Hansen holds a 
similar view to that of Parsons and Raviv (1985), by suggesting that fully committed underwriting is 
compensated through favoured stock price movements. Furthermore, Hansen adds the potential costs of 
trading rights as another example why underwriters are employed, which would avoid this friction. 
 
However, there are other views concerning the expensive use of underwriters, which disregards 
explanations related to the observed costs. Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) developing a model explaining 
floatation choices in equity offerings, argue that asymmetric information between investors and firms 
seeking equity financing will affect the firms’ choice. Their model is consistent with the rights issue 
paradox, supporting that firms favour underwritten options despite being more costly than uninsured 
rights issues, and find that firms that do use uninsured rights issues do not set prices at low levels to 
ensure full subscription. Furthermore, Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) argue that the quality of the firms is 
revealed in its choice of equity offering method; firms that choose standby underwriting are of the highest 
quality since these firms are able to stay indifferent to subscription price; rights issues are utilised by the 
firms of intermediary quality, since the firm is able to set a subscription price that benefits from a 
signalling mechanism; and firms using fully underwritten agreements are those of lowest quality, since 
subscription and prices are unobservable by investors. 
 
Aligned with Heinkel and Schwartz’s (1986) arguments is Booth and Smith’s (1986) hypothesis that 
underwriters serve as a certification of the issue being made at a correct price level when asymmetric 
information is present.  Shareholders who are insiders and have influence an equity issue may have 
adverse incentives to overstate equity prices, inconsistent with inside information held. Outside investors 
can be made aware that the equity offering is correctly priced when certified by an utilised 
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underwriter. This is of course in contrast to theory regarding market timing, in which the exploiting of 
overvalued stock is a key driver of equity issues (Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995). 
 
Perhaps the most seminal paper regarding the rights issue paradox is Eckbo and Masulis’s 1992 take on 
adverse selection and the rights issue paradox. Studying the rights issue paradox in practise, Eckbo and Masulis 
(1992) study the choice of equity floatation methods for U.S. exchange listed firms and find that the 
choice of method is largely dependent on information asymmetries in the market, shareholder 
characteristics, and direct floatation costs. The associated factors affecting the choice of equity floatation 
method are further dependent on the expected shareholder takeup, the new issued equity expected to be 
subscribed by shareholders. Alike Hansen and Pinkerton’s (1982) theories of central shareholders’ effect 
on floatation method, expected takeup increases with precommitments of stock subscription, serving as a 
substitute to underwriting. Furthermore, Smith’s (1977) rights issue paradox is observed for their sample; 
Equity offerings through fully committed underwriting and standby commitments are significantly higher 
than that of uninsured rights, and standby commitments come at lower costs than that of fully committed 
underwriting, yet, uninsured rights disappears in the early 1980’s. Partly explaining this is the adoption of 
dividend reinvestment plans, which provide existing shareholders new shares, argued to serve as a 
substitution to rights offerings when managers are reluctant to cut dividends. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) 
further argue that a trade-off in adverse-selection cost affects the reason for firms choosing underwritten 
floatation methods. By employing underwriters in equity offerings, firms may minimize adverse-selection 
costs implied from not reaching adequate subscription in rights issues. A failed offer would lead to less 
proceeds and a punished stock price. Standby underwriting can thusly be motivated through the insurance 
against risk of rights offer failure, and furthermore, Eckbo and Masulis argue that the use of underwriting 
can be rational when the volatility of the issuing firm is high and the risk for rights offer failure 
consequently is high. Hence, firms can avoid adverse-selection costs only by having shareholder 
precommitments or through the use of underwriters.  
 
Similar to U.S. listed firms, Bohren et al (1997) find comparable results on the Oslo stock exchange; 
Underwriting is the dominating floatation method in Norway. Bohren et al (1997) study the probability of 
using a standby underwriting using a probit analysis, in which expected shareholder takeup serves as a key 
determinant and that the use of standby underwriting is more likely when expected shareholder takeup is 
low. Moreover, the authors also study the market reaction to floatation methods. The findings suggest that 
uninsured rights issues are premiered by the market compared to standby underwriting upon public 
announcement. 
 
Studying the U.K. equity market, Lai et al (2000) find that rights offers were dominant up until 1986, 
during which firm commitment offerings became increasingly more popular. Furthermore, they argue that 
the reason for the forthcoming preference for this floatation method is due to the firm not having to issue 
discounted uninsured rights to existing shareholder while simultaneously signalling that an underwriter is 
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willing to fully commit funds to the firm for the offering, which has positive effects on the stock price, 
aligned with the arguments of Booth and Smith (1986). Additionally, Lai et al (2000) argue that the 
positive influence of underwriting as firm certification, through its implied role of monitoring and 
dispersion of ownership, offsets the problem of adverse selection associated with having concentrated 
ownership in equity issues, as argued by Myers and Majluf (1984). 
 
Balachandran et al (2008), study market reactions of equity issues and choice of floatation methods on the 
Australian stock market. Similarly to Lai et al (2000), Balachandran et al (2008), find that there are 
significant signalling benefits of floatation methods in which fully underwritten methods provide the least 
unfavourable market reaction in an equity issue which serves as a contrast to the theories developed by 
Henkel and Schwartz (1989). Balachandran et al’s empirical modular findings differ to those of Bohren et 
al (1997), indicating that there are varying results in different international settings, calling for additional 
studies in new settings. Moreover, they find that subscription price discount is positively related to firm 
idiosyncratic risks and observed by the market, which suggests that high-quality firms exhibit an aversion 
to too deep discounts in offer price. 
 
Finally, Ginglinger et al (2013) find that the choice of floatation method is dependent on stock market 
liquidity and shareholder takeup. An important finding is that standby underwriting is said to provide 
improved liquidity in comparison to uninsured rights on the observed data set of public French firms. 
4.3 Background to equity offerings in Sweden 
Building on existing literature, we find that testing the rights issue paradox as well as investigating 
floatation choice in the Swedish equity market to be a relevant topic for this thesis, and given the 
availability of data, Sweden serves as a strong setting.  
 
In Sweden, firm’s equity issues are usually conducted together with a financial advisor, which produces the 
relevant and required material. The Swedish financial supervisory authority 6  must approve any 
prospectuses prepared before the firm is allowed to engage in an equity offering7. Within the prospectus, 
the firm discloses, among other things, the gross proceeds of the equity offering and the costs associated 
with raising capital. Moreover, the firm discloses any subscription precommitments as well as other 
agreements present, such as lock up agreements, as well as what series of stock is being offered. The use 
of standby agreements or underwriters is disclosed and, furthermore, the compensation for these 
arrangements is often presented as part of the total cost of the offering. The compensation is often 
disclosed in absolute figures but also as a percentage of the amount of stock insured by the standby 
agreement. In addition, the identities of standby agreement underwriters are presented. 
 
                                                      
6 Sw. ”Finansinspektionen”. 
7 Historically, some issues may not have been processed by FI but are not included in the sample.  
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In Sweden, firm committed underwriting is, to our knowledge, virtually non-existent, whereas new issues 
are usually floated through uninsured rights or by using standby agreements in SEOs and with or without 
standby agreements in IPOs. Thus, Sweden’s conditions of underwriting are to a large extent alike that of 
what Bohren et al (1997) observed in the Oslo stock exchange. The Swedish equity markets and stock 
exchanges serve as an interesting setting for studying choice of floatation method and the rights issue 
paradox due to underwriting typically being conducted by individual investors. Moreover, the standby 
underwriter is taxed equivalent to a seller of a put option, since the mechanism for both contracts are the 
same (Swedish Tax Agency, 2017). Additionally, parties involved in the standby agreements can also be 
firms, banks and other financial advisors. Individual investors are many times existing shareholders 
holding significant share of stock the company, sometimes defined as blockholders (Ginglinger et al, 
2013), but can also be investors that at the time lack ownership within the issuing company. Moreover, 
firms provided the opportunity to act as standby underwriters are many times representing some major 
shareholder within the issuing company. Banks and financial advisors, which represent a minority of 
underwriters, also have the opportunity to insure rights using standby agreements and act much like their 
international peers in the offering. Furthermore, these parties can also play a role in providing services 
adjacent to the offering, such as providing liquidity in the in the aftermarket. The process of finding and 
choosing individuals and parties for standby agreements is in this unobservable. A 2010 interview with 
Swedish financial advisors suggests that large shareholders in the issuing firm are often chosen as 
underwriters and in case where no such shareholders are present or interested, external parties are 
consulted (Gustavsson and Lindström, 2010).  
4.4 Background to thesis 
The issuer of stock will select the floatation method that maximizes the net issue benefits and thus, 
underwriting is justified when being more cost efficient than issuing uninsured rights (Eckbo and Masulis, 
1992). Consequently, the direct cost of underwriting in standbys should be less than the indirect costs 
rights issues. Hence, the purpose of the standby underwriter is arguably to ensure successful equity 
offerings and, as a result of the firm employing an underwriter, instil more confidence among investors 
concerned with the success of the offering. Increased interest in subscribing to the offer should cause 
reduced indirect costs from risk of offering failure. Accordingly, arguments for using costly underwriters 
are founded on minimising information asymmetries through signalling and certification (Booth and 
smith, 1986; and Smith, 1989) and other ideas related to benefits of underwriting or decreasing indirect 
costs of rights issues. Should this not be true, a rights issue paradox might be prevalent and the use of 
underwriters could instead be explained by alternative theories, such as agency problems first suggested by 
Smith (1977). 
 
Since firms in Sweden issue equity using uninsured rights or by using standby underwriting, where not 
only financial institutions but also individual investors can take on the roles of underwriters, the rationale 
for using underwriting becomes complex. While, Booth and Smith’s (1986) theory of certification hold for 
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banks serving as underwriters in Sweden, helping to mitigate information asymmetries, the majority of 
Swedish underwriters are not banks. Naturally, this theory could be extended to include individual 
investors as providers of certification, similar to Leland and Pyle (1977) theory for investors with inside 
information willing to invest in projects and consequently signalling to other investors. In this case, 
individual investors serving as standby agreement underwriters could signal the quality of the company 
through their informational advantage and ability to signal the true quality of the firm and its investment 
opportunities. However, should the standby underwriter be unknown to the public and the exploits of 
little significance, the use of a standby underwriter could instead be explained by the existence of potential 
agency problems. Large shareholders with influence over choice the floatation method could promote 
standby agreements in which the influential shareholders themselves are elected as underwriters. Given 
the fee structure in standby underwriting, the underwriters can in successful offerings be remunerated 
without committing capital, and in unsuccessful offerings increase existing ownership at reduced share 
prices. Here, the influential shareholders serve as agents acting in the interest of the minor shareholders, 
the principals. The agency problem thus lies in the choice of underwriting, instead of maximizing net issue 
benefits. Based on existing theory, the use of underwriting can thusly be viewed from two rather 
conflicting perspectives; Firstly, the use for underwriters is justified as a means to mitigate information 
asymmetries through certification and other benefits; Secondly, the use of standby underwriters is due to 
existing agency problems in which major shareholders, representing the minor shareholders, can benefit 
from acting as standby underwriters. 
 
Our research intends to explain the determinants of underwriting, investigating if a rights issue paradox is 
present, and to understand the drivers of underwriting compensation. Unlike some of the chosen 
independent variables, being to a large extent focused on firm specific information, in existing studies 
such as Eckbo and Masulis (1992), Bohren et al (1997) and Ginglinger et al. (2013), we have chosen to 
base our studies on issue specific variables, and added a variable that relate to the economic sentiment 
among Swedish firms and investors. Our independent variables are thus comparable across time and 
firms, and are not subject to, for example, different accounting standards across exchanges.   
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5 Method 
In the following section, we present the data collection process and the nature of our data. Following this 
we present three subsections of our empirical models.  
5.1 Data Collection 
The data used in this study is manually derived from prospectuses that have been approved by the 
Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority8 between October 2006 and January 2017, thus extracting a fully 
comprehensive data set with regards to the availability at the time of conducting this study. Because this 
study is based on observing how firms make use of underwriters when conducting equity offerings, we 
select a relevant sample where such transactions are identified. This section will cover the process applied 
to identify the relevant prospectuses and the steps conducted when collecting the relevant variables.  
 
According to the Swedish FSA, there are two occurrences when firms must prepare prospectuses. The 
first being that tradable securities are offered to the public, for example through an equity issuance, and 
the second being that tradable securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market. Since our study 
builds on transactions and corresponding prospectuses where firms have issued equity, all prospectuses 
connected to not issuing equity, such as take-over bids, switching exchanges, and bond offerings will be 
excluded. Furthermore, offerings exclusively targeted towards a particular group of people, such as 
employee stock purchase plans or direct equity issues will be excluded because underwriters will not be 
able to take a part in such a transaction. 
 
Upon having applied the above stated conditions, the sample is further scrutinized and additional 
prospectuses are excluded. In line with Bohren et al (1997), we only include firms that are listed on the 
major exchanges, thereby excluding firms from alternative trading platforms such as Alternativa 
aktiemarknaden, Mangoldlistan, as well as other public firms which shares are not regularly traded. The 
underlying reason is that firms traded infrequently are unaffected by the market’s efficient pricing of their 
shares, and furthermore, that such firms’ information sharing is rather limited, not least due less strict 
demands from regulators. Included transactions comprise of the ones made by firms that are or are to be 
traded on a regulated market or a multilateral trading facility (MTF)9,10. 
                                                      
8 Transactions of the nature included in this study may be conducted without establishing a prospectus 
such as when the offering is spread among less than 150 retail investors in a state within the EEA. 
However, to our knowledge prospectuses admitted by the Swedish FSA represent a majority of all public 
equity transactions. 
9 Aktietorget (MTF), First North/First North Premier (MTF), NGM Equity (Regulated Market), Nordic 
MTF (MTF) and Nasdaq Stockholm (Regulated Market). 
 
 16 
 
Furthermore, we exclude transactions where preferred shares are issued. Since preferred shares do not 
render any ownership in the issuing firm, but instead implies a liability towards for the issuer the 
instrument does not have the same properties as common shares. Applying this as our last selection 
criteria, we reduce our sample from approximately 1 100 to 703 prospectuses representing an equally large 
number of equity offerings, that have been conducted between October 2006 until January 2017.  
 
From the sample of prospectuses, we derive a number of issue-specific variables, such as if underwriters 
have been employed. We also include a macro-related variable that aims to measure the overall economic 
sentiment through the confidence among consumers and corporates. Moreover, the information on 
floatation costs is extracted from the prospectuses of the associated offerings, in which direct cost of 
floatation is provided including a specification of the cost of underwriting if applicable. Although some of 
the firms included in our sample conduct seasoned equity offerings multiple times during the period, the 
vast majority only occur once and the data set does therefore not exhibit a panel data structure. In 
conclusion, the information provided in our sample should serve as a relevant and sufficient foundation 
for our estimations. 
5.1.1 Data reliability  
The dataset used in this study consists of manually collected data, as well as data derived from the National 
Institute of Economic Research’s (NIER, Sw. “Konjunkturinstitutet”) Economic Tendency Survey Indicators. 
There is always a downside risk related to collecting data manually, not least due to human errors in the 
collection process. However, collecting the data manually also implies a higher probability that the data 
has been less exploited in prior studies. Although the Swedish FSA does not guarantee the content of a 
prospectus, there is a fairly rigorous scrutiny process the proceeds the publication of a prospectuses, and 
therefore we suggest that that part of our data set is to be considered as reliable. We also find it reasonable 
to assume that the data from the NIER is reliable. 
 
5.1.2 Limitations to sample 
There are some areas of limitations with regards to the existing sample. For example, limitations are made 
due to the lack of historical records to some of the companies existent in the sample. Many of the firms 
do not exist in present day and we have lacked the resources needed for retrieving some parameters of 
interest, such as stockholder composition. To counterpart some of the limited parameters we use proxy 
variables supported by academic theory instead. Furthermore, with respect to certain variables that involve 
monetary values we have not made any adjustments for inflation. Fortunately, the inflation rate in Sweden 
                                                                                                                                                                      
10 Prospectuses that have been passported from other EU countries have been excluded if the firm is not 
primarily listed on any of the mentioned exchanges or MTFs. This limitation also implies that depositary 
receipts are excluded from this study since such an instrument is used when the firm is cross-listed. 
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has been relatively low during the period from which we have taken our sample and furthermore we have 
been able to utilize fractions rather than absolute numbers in most of the models, so the overall effect 
should not impact our results in a significant manner.   
 
A goal of our dataset is to find relevant information that explains firms’ choice of underwriting. The 
decision of making an equity offering is taken by the board of directors and shareholders at a general 
shareholders meeting at a time specified in the prospectus. However, the time when the firm made a 
decision on floatation method is not disclosed. From insights of our sample, we believe that the choice of 
floatation method is secondary to the choice of making an equity offering and the decision is likely to have 
been made between the choice of issuing equity and the publication of the prospectus. Although, firms 
have the opportunity to provide a prospectus supplement (Sw. Tilläggsprospekt) in which changes to the 
original prospectus has occurred, such as the choice of employing standby underwriters. In summary, 
since we cannot extract the timing of the decision of floatation method, we cannot make an exact 
inference on when the decision has been taken place and we have to rely on general assumptions with 
regards to the time coverage of our economic sentiment variable.  
 
5.2 Empirical models 
Departing from the data described above, we will in the following sections present the three models that 
this thesis is based upon. Quantitative methods are employed for all research. The first model is a logistic 
model aiming to estimate the probability that a firm makes use of underwriting when issuing equity. That 
model makes use of 703 observations, while models two and three are based on 517 and 407 observations 
respectively. The second model is estimated using the OLS method and covers costs regarding floatation, 
while the last specification, for which we apply Heckman’s sample selection method, estimates the cost of 
underwriting. Furthermore, because our samples are relatively large in all models we will, in accordance 
with Brooks (2015), throughout the thesis assume that the data is normally distributed.  
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5.3 Logit model for the standby decision 
In the following section, we aim to study the floatation choice among Swedish firms offering equity. We 
study the determinants of using a standby agreement based on our sample of 703 observations of equity 
offerings in Sweden during the period late 2006 to early 2017. All equity offerings from our data collection 
are used and include both SEOs and IPOs as both offerings frequent standby decisions as a floatation 
choice. Table 1 presented below sets forth some interesting statistics regarding Swedish floatation 
methods. 
 
As table 1 shows, equity offerings in Sweden are made up of a mix of SEOs and IPOs, in which SEOs 
make up the majority of offerings. Underwritten offerings for all years constitute a majority of offerings as 
a total. However, regarded separately, it is apparent that underwritten issues are more common in SEOs 
than IPOs. A majority of SEOs included in the sample are accompanied by an underwriter, with highest 
share of underwriting in 2008, 2014, and 2015, and lower shares of underwriting in 2007 and 2016. This is 
                                                      
11 The prospectus register was launched by the Swedish FSA in October 2006. 
12 Sample cut-off point January 31st 2017. 
Year No 
offerings 
SEOs IPOs Per cent standbys, 
All offerings 
Per cent standbys, 
SEOs 
Per cent standbys, 
IPOs 
200611 14 9 5 43% 44% 40% 
2007 77 40 37 40% 55% 29% 
2008 61 49 12 64% 78% 8% 
2009 78 75 3 65% 67% 33% 
2010 79 68 11 63% 71% 18% 
2011 62 50 12 61% 72% 17% 
2012 55 51 4 65% 71% 0% 
2013 42 36 6 67% 75% 17% 
2014 60 39 21 62% 79% 29% 
2015 69 36 33 52% 78% 24% 
2016 101 60 41 50% 68% 24% 
201712 5 4 1 80% 100% 0% 
Total 703 517 186 58% 71% 23% 
Table 1. Statistics on floatation methods in Sweden between late 2006 to early 2017. The data is 
derived from the 703 prospectuses on which this thesis is built.  
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in contrast to what Cronqvist and Nilsson’s (2005) 1986-1999 samples of Swedish equity offerings 
exhibited, in which 53 SEOs out of 160 were underwritten, indicating that there is a clear increased 
propensity to utilize underwriting over time. However, in our sample, little intuition is provided to weather 
an increased propensity for underwriting is observable as a trend across 2007-2016 for Swedish firms. 
Similar levels of standby underwriting is although found in Bohren et al’s (1997) 1980-1993 in which 
roughly 60 per cent of common stock issues were accompanied by standby underwriters. 
 
As firms issuing equity on the Swedish stock market has a binary floatation choice, using or not using 
underwriting, a logistic model aligned with existing literature to estimate determinants is deemed 
appropriate. Bohren et al. (1997) use a two-step analysis involving an OLS and a probit model to explain 
firms’ standby decision in SEOs. After having estimated shareholder takeup in an initial model, a probit 
regression is estimated. Here, shareholder takeup as well as stock and market volatility are used as 
independent variables. Bohren et al (1997) find shareholder takeup and firm volatility to be significant in 
explaining a lower probability in using a standby while market volatility is insignificant. Cronqvist and 
Nilsson (2005) use a nested logit model to study the firm choice between issuing equity in SEOs or in 
private placement. As opposed to Bohren et al (1997), Cronqvist and Nilsson’s coefficient for 
idiosyncratic risk is positive but insignificant. Ginglinger et al (2013) use a multinomial logit analysis to 
study three floatation choices in French companies issuing equity using standby rights, mixed and pure 
public offerings. Ginglinger et al’s (2013) model includes issue specifics, such as gross proceeds as well as 
firm specific variables, such as shareholder concentration and stock liquidity. They find that high liquidity 
firms are more likely to use standby underwriting. 
5.3.1 Variables 
Due to existing literature’s results concerning firm specific characteristics and a lack of possibility in 
extracting similar information for many of the firms, such as shareholder characteristics and idiosyncratic 
risks, our model is developed with the issuing environment in mind.  
 
We use subscription precommitments (SPRE) inspired by Eckbo and Masulis’s (1992) and Ginglinger et 
al’s (2013) variables for shareholder concentration. The variable is expressed as a per cent , and represents 
the percentage of shares presubscribed in the offering. Here, the mean observation is ca 26 per cent and 
the median ca 21 per cent. Subscription precommitments can be used as a substitute to underwriting, 
since a large expected shareholder takeup, which is the logical consequence to large precommitments, 
should imply lower risks of offer failure. Based on these assumptions, we expect subscription 
precommitments to add a negative relationship to the probability of using underwriting, the probability of 
underwriting decreases with precommitments. However, it is important to state that while literature such 
as Bohren et al (1997) argue that large shareholder concentration in firms should be aligned with the firm 
making value maximizing decisions from these shareholders monitoring management, and thus choosing 
not to use underwriting, underwriting in Sweden can in fact be engaged in by large shareholders. This 
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could instead present an agency problem among shareholders. Where major shareholders, the agents, 
represent the minor shareholders, the principals, and have incentives to engage in underwriting, despite 
being more costly for the firm, since they would benefit from remuneration of their underwriting. We 
therefore find that shareholder concentration as a parameter itself lacks purpose in this study, why we 
choose to ignore it in favour of shareholder precommitments. 
 
In order to properly capture the level of information asymmetries, we use the variable PRIMEX, a dummy 
variable stating if the firm is listed on the primary exchange in Sweden. Furthermore, being listed on the 
primary exchange also implies a more thorough accounting disclosure than alternative exchanges and 
possibly improved liquidity. Here, we are inspired by the theories regarding certification (Booth and 
Smith, 1986), arguing that firms listed on this exchange are associated with a higher degree of quality. On 
the one hand, should firms listed on this exchange be more prone towards underwriting, theories of 
quality firms using underwriting to properly signal their quality could hold true (Heinkel and Schwartz, 
1986). On the other hand, firms listed on exchanges associated with a lower degree of quality could be at 
higher risk of offer failure or adverse selection costs, and therefore be more at need of underwriting 
indicating that PRIMEX should serve to be negative. However, it is important to critically regard the 
certification and signalling benefits associated with underwriting in our study, since underwriters in our 
sample are imperfect at providing these benefits. Therefore, our initial expectations are that firms on the 
primary exchange are in lower need of underwriting due to their implied disclosure benefits that may 
mitigate adverse selection. 
 
An additional variable that proxy information asymmetry is added. UNITS is a binary variable that register 
1 if the issuing firm offers units, a combination of shares and warrants or other option-like instruments, 
and 0 if not.  Byon and Moore (2003) use units as a dependent variable in a logit model and find that firms 
that experience higher volatility as well as young firms tend to issue units. We expect that units are 
associated with a higher degree of risk of offering failure as well as higher degrees of information 
asymmetries, and we therefore expect the UNITS coefficient to be positive in explaining the use of 
underwriting. 
 
Mitigating information asymmetries between the firm and investors through preventing potential agency 
problems with invested managers, lockup contracts imply that key investors in the company are not to sell 
shares after the equity offering and thus communicating long-term intentions among these owners. Brav 
and Gompers (2003) study lockups as signals of firm quality, commitment devices to mitigate moral 
hazard, and lockups as a means for underwriters to extract additional compensation. The study finds that  
lockups are effective as commitment devices and for signalling purposes. The variable LCKUP is in our 
model a binary variable which takes on the value 1 if the firm has any lockup provisions outstanding and 0 
if not. Based on the purpose of lockups and Brav and Gompers findings, we expect that LCKUP to have a 
negative relation to the probability of underwriting. 
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To complete our regression, we choose to add, ETI, for this type of estimation. The variable ETI 
represents economic sentiment based on the index Economic Tendency Indicator (Sw. “Barometerindikator”), as 
provided monthly by the Swedish NIER. The indicator is generated from a survey sent to Swedish 
businesses and households quantifying their beliefs and confidence in the Swedish economy. This variable 
is inspired by the idiosyncratic risks and market risk measurements existent in literature, aimed at 
explaining floatation choice (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Bohren et al., 1997; and Ginglinger et al, 2013). 
While not perfectly comparable across domestic markets, we find this to be a relevant complement in 
research, particularly since market risk having indicated to be insignificant in Bohren et al’s probit model 
(1997)13. For the monthly indicator to be of relevance in our study, we take the mean of the six months 
previous to the last day of the subscription period. When estimating idiosyncratic and systematic risk, 
existing research use time frames between 310 (Bohren et al, 1997) to 5 days prior to equity offering 
announcement (Gingliner et al, 2013). We choose our time span to fully absorb the prevailing economic 
beliefs that are occurring when the firm decides upon using standby underwriting in its offering. Due to 
the fact that this indicator is based on monthly data, the variable is not unique for each issuance but is the 
same for firms issuing equity in the same period. This makes the variable interesting across the time 
dimension. A negative coefficient should be able to indicate if firms engage in standby underwriting as a 
means of mitigating risks of offer failure in times when the economy has poor expectations. Descriptive 
statistics are presented in table 2 below. 
 
 Underwritten SPRE PRIMEX  UNITS  LCKUP ETI 
 Mean 0.579  0.255  0.320  0.081  0.310 100.768 
 Median 1  0.211  0  0  0 102.500 
 Maximum 1  1  1  1  1 115.900 
 Minimum 0  0  0  0  0 69.367 
 Std. Dev. 0.494  0.258  0.467  0.273  0.463 10.870 
 Observations 703  703  703  703  703  703 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics that cover variables included in the logit model for standby decision. The 
table contains the binary dependent variable Underwritten representing if the firm made use of an 
underwriter in the issue. Subscription precommitments (SPRE) represent the fraction of the issue that had 
been subscribed to upon issuing the prospectus, while primary exchange (PRIMEX), units and lock-up 
(LCKUP) are binary variables that take on the value one if correct, and zero otherwise. The 
macroeconomic sentiment is measured through the ETI variable. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
13 We initially tested for market risk but found that the measurement likely to be imperfect without 
support of idiosyncratic risk which resulted in insignificant coefficients in the model. 
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5.3.2 Model and execution 
The first model is specified accordingly: 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐶𝐾𝑈𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 
Specification 1. Logistic regression. 
 
In line with what has been discussed previously, a logistic approach is utilized when estimating the above 
specified model. A logistic model is a transformed version of the linear model that is based on the 
cumulative logistic probability distribution, which constrains the variables included in the specification to 
not take on values outside the scope of the binary dependent variable. The steps involved in the 
transformation from a linear model to a logistic model as well as a figure that illustrates the differences 
between the models can be found in appendix 1. Upon conducting a logistic model, it is important to pay 
attention to its underlying assumptions. Amongst them are that the model is assumed to be correctly 
specified, implying that it is neither over nor under specified. Another factor that must be taken into 
consideration is that this kind of non-linear model is known to be inconsistent if for example unmeasured 
heterogeneity or heteroscedasticity is present (Greene 2012). This implies that we add yet another 
assumption to the model. Although one could try to alleviate the potential issue with heteroscedasticity by 
estimating robust standard errors, it would not solve the actual issue since the robust standard errors for 
an estimation that is in other ways inconsistent will not solve the issue. Due to these circumstances, we 
conclude that heteroscedasticity is not dealt with in this particular model. However, other potential 
problems remain: one of them is the possible issue regarding the time series component of the model: the 
ETI variable. In order to decipher the actual effect rendering from the ETI variable, one must test if the 
observations are trend stationary (Greene, 2012). In line with this, an augmented Dickey Fuller test is 
conducted, see appendix 2, and results show that the data exhibits stationarity, which may partly be a 
consequence of the variable building on an index that reverts around 100.  Following the stationarity test, 
we continue the diagnostic testing by utilizing a number of standard evaluations related to the potential 
problem stemming from multicollinearity. Because multicollinearity can result from bivariate relations 
between independent variables as well as from complex relations involving several of the independent 
variables, the issue is evaluated using three different methods. First of all, we conclude that no bivariate 
correlation is near the critical threshold of 0.8 (Franke, 2010), thereby exhibiting any risk of 
multicollinearity. Following this, we observe that no standard errors from the output are especially large 
relative their respective coefficient values. And lastly, variance inflation factors (VIF) are observed only to 
conclude that none of them pass any critical threshold such as the commonly used VIF>10 (Burns and 
Burns, 2011). Calculations are provided in appendix 3. 
 
Based on the above presented information, the model is assumed to produce consistent and unbiased 
output. Following this, it is vital to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of the model relative the data applied. In 
doing so we first observe that the pseudo R2 of the model is approximately six per cent. The pseudo R2 
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differs slightly from the ordinary R2 which is accompanied by ordinary linear models in that it is not based 
on minimizing the residual sum of squares, but instead is based on maximizing the log-likelihood function 
(Brooks 2015). A consequence of this is that the interval of what is an excellent fit of the model is reduced 
to an R2-value of around 20 to 40 per cent (McFadden 1979), which implies that our result may be 
interpreted as a good enough fit. Second we estimate the models predictability properties and in that we 
apply a cut-off point at 0.5 rather than 1 because our data is approximately balanced between 0/1-
observations. The output from the test shows that 65 per cent of the observations are correctly predicted, 
however, with a bias towards the observations where an underwriter is present that showed an 85 per cent 
predictability rate. See table 3 below, for illustration (complete output table can be found in appendix 4). 
  Prediction (cut-off 0.5) 
  1 0 
T
ru
e 
v
al
u
e 1 344/85% 189/64% 
0 63/15% 107/36% 
Table 3. Goodness-of-fit results for the logit model. 
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5.4 Direct cost of floatation 
Having observed the probabilities of utilising standbys in equity issues, we follow the studies of Bohren et 
al (1997), Eckbo and Masulis (1992), and Ginglinger et al (2013), and estimate the costs of floatation. 
Estimating the direct cost of floatation, and the relationship underwriting has to this cost, is key to the 
investigation of a possible rights issue paradox within the domestic Swedish equity market. A positive 
effect of standby underwriting on the cost of floatation should provide support for the possibility of the 
existence of a rights issue paradox on the Swedish market. In order to determine that a rights issue 
paradox is present, indirect cost of floatation would have to be compared. However, this is outside the 
scope of this thesis.   
 
In this study, we narrow the sample to those issues that involve rights, which therefore excludes IPOs, 
rendering a sample of 517 common stock issues made by 280 companies. As was disclosed in table 1, the 
majority of SEOs utilised underwriting, which suggests that the Swedish equity market too could be 
affected by a rights issue paradox. Some further insights are provided in table 4 below. 
 
 
The issue specific information in table 4 above provides some intuition to the sample at hand. Companies 
issuing equity in Sweden do so in substantially varying quantities, as is suggested by the large difference 
between the mean and median of gross proceeds. However, the difference between the mean and median 
in direct cost of floatation as a percentage show increased similarity among the companies, making this 
part of the estimation highly comparable. 
 
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) first suggested to use a multivariate framework to estimate direct floatation 
costs, instead univariate model, such as Smith’s (1977) comparisons. In Eckbo and Masulis (1992) model, 
they use an OLS specification with direct floatation costs as the dependent variable, expressed as a 
Issue characteristics 
Disclaimer: Figures unadjusted for inflation 
Mean Median 
Gross proceeds, MSEK 342 713 482 45 000 000 
Issuing cost, SEK 6 880 112 2 800 000 
Underwriting cost, SEK 6 295 027 1 200 000 
Cost of floatation (Total), SEK 13 175 139 4 000 000 
Cost of floatation (Total), % 
(Cost of floatation/Gross proceeds) 
9% 8% 
Table 4. This table shows issue characteristics that have been observed in the sample. Gross proceeds as 
well as costs in absolute values have a relatively high variance, while the cost of floatation as a percentage 
indicates that it, no matter of issuing size, has a similar distribution. 
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percentage of the issue related expenses, including underwriter fees, as a share of gross proceeds. Firm 
specific variables such as shareholder concentration, new shares issued, the firm’s idiosyncratic risk, 
expressed as the standard deviation of stock price over a specified period, and change in shares 
outstanding as a result of the offering, make up the majority of the independent variables. Additionally, 
they use issue specific information, such as natural log of gross proceeds as well as dummy variables on 
floatation methods. Most of the parameters are significant, indicating the model to be successful at 
estimating the cross sectional variability of floatation costs. Moreover, Bohren et al (1997) use a similar 
cross sectional model for their sample and add stock market standard deviation as a risk measure of 
market risk. Their model lacks significance in most of the explanatory variables but nonetheless generates 
an R2 of 38 per cent. Ginlinger et al’s (2013) model approximates that of the aforementioned authors’ 
models but in addition adds a shareholder takeup and a liquidity component, based on floatation methods 
having different effects on share liquidity. 
5.4.1 Variables 
Significant and observed in all aforementioned methods is that underwriting is linked to higher floatation 
costs. We use a multivariate model inspirited by existing literature, but adjust for the information available 
to us. We use DFC, direct floatation costs, i.e. underwriter fees and other expenses paid in the issue, as a 
share of gross proceeds. The variable is normalized and thus comparable across the sample and is the 
dependent variable in this regression. 
 
Regressing on DFC, we use a set of issue specific variables including the natural log of gross proceeds, 
PRO, as inspired by existing literature on direct cost of floatation (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Bohren et al, 
1997; and Ginglinger et al, 2013). We include subscription precommitments, the SPRE variable from our 
logit specification, which can be said to substitute aforementioned literature’s measurements of 
shareholder concentration and expected takeup. UNITS is added, and to our knowledge unique for 
estimating floatation costs in any setting. We use UNITS as a binary variable due to the combination of 
instruments it represents in an issue and because of its signal of firm characteristics; Young and volatile 
firms issue units according to Byon and Moore (2003). ETI is used as a substitute to risk and volatility 
measures used in existing literature, but also provides an intuition if economic sentiment help explain 
floatation costs. Lastly, STAND is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has chosen to use a 
standby underwriter and 0 if not, which is inspired by the models of aforementioned research models 
(Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Bohren et al, 1997; and Ginglinger et al, 2013). 
 
Our expectations are aligned with the results of existing literature. We expect to see a negative relationship 
between gross proceeds and the cost of floatation as Eckbo and Masulis (1992) found in their study. This 
is motivated by the argument of economies of scale with regards to the associated services provided by the 
financial advisor. Consequently, we believe that firms issuing smaller gross proceeds will have higher 
relative costs of raising capital through equity. 
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We expect that subscription precommitments reduce the percentage cost due to larger precommitments 
leading to a higher expected takeup and, accordingly, less share distribution services provided by the 
advisor. This is aligned with the shareholder takeup ideas of Eckbo and Masulis (1992), which shaped 
Bohren et al’s (1997) and Ginglinger et al’s (2013) direct cost of floatation regressions. 
 
Because units are associated with young and high-risk companies (Byon and Moore, 2003), we believe that 
they should lack bargaining power with regards to the costs linked to the issuance. Moreover, since units 
are combinations of stock and options, their generation could stipulate additional efforts by the financial 
advisor, thus leading to increased costs. Before using this variable, we have made sure that no noteworthy 
correlation between it and PRO exists. 
 
With regards to the economic tendency indicator, ETI, we believe that issue-related expenses should 
decrease as economic sentiment rise. We assume, on a theoretical level, that confidence and optimism in 
the stock market should stipulate believes of improved offer success rates and therefore lead to decreased 
efforts by or reduced costs to the financial advisor. We assume that the financial advisors should in good 
times experience more business and therefore compete by reducing prices. It is important to mention that 
Bohren et al’s (1997) measurement of the market’s standard deviation proved to be insignificant in 
explaining both direct floatation costs and the standby decision. Here, we hope that ETI should be more 
effective in explaining direct floatation cost by being better at capturing aspects important of direct 
floatation costs. 
 
Finally, we believe that the use of underwriters should be positive in affecting the cost of floatation, as is 
aligned with existing theory and serves as foundational to discourse of a rights issue paradox (Eckbo and 
Masulis, 1992; Bohren et al, 1997; and Ginglinger et al, 2013). Naturally, a positive relationship between 
using underwriters and direct floatation costs can be explained by the standby underwriter providing 
additional services through insuring the offering against risk of failure. However, the cost incurred will be 
dependent on who is underwriting. For example, an under diversified individual investor may require 
higher remuneration to provide underwriting than a diversified bank. Therefore, the remuneration made 
to underwriters, which we assume to vary between issues, will affect the outcome of this variable. An 
insignificant or negative coefficient should therefore suggest that a rights issue paradox is non-prevalent in 
the Swedish equity market. Descriptive statistics are provided in table 5 below. 
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Direct cost of 
floatation PRO SPRE UNITS ETI STAND 
 Mean  0.093  17.901  0.267  0.085  99.268  0.706 
 Median  0.088  17.622  0.242  0.000  102.017  1.000 
 Maximum  0.306  24.043  1  1  115.900  1 
 Minimum  0.00014  15.151  0  0  69.367  0 
 Std. Dev.  0.051  1.481  0.245  0.279  11.669  0.456 
 Observations  517  517  517  517  517  517 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics covering variables included in the model estimating the direct cost of 
floatation. The first variable represents the cost of floatation, which is calculated as the issue costs though 
the gross proceeds. Remaining variables are presented in the following order: log of issue proceeds (PRO), 
subscription precommitments (SPRE), units, macroeconomic variable (ETI) and standby agreement 
(STAND). 
 
5.4.2 Model and execution 
The model described above is specified below. 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 
Specification 2. OLS model. 
 
In contrast to our first model, where we observed the binary choice between using an underwriter or not, 
our second model has a dependent variable that can take on all values between 0 and 1.  Although the 
independent variables still should not take on values that exceed or go beneath the 0 to 1 interval, we may 
not utilise a logistic regression due to its underlying assumptions, for example that the dependent variable 
must be dichotomous. Instead, we apply an ordinary least squares method, which also aligns with previous 
studies, such as Eckbo et al. (1992), and thereby allow for linear relationships as well as normally 
distributed independent variables. 
 
The OLS technique aims at minimizing the residual sum of squares by fitting the most appropriate line 
through the regressors of the model. This implies that the explanatory factor R2 can be interpreted as the 
per cent of the variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by the independent variables, 
which thereby makes it slightly easier to interpret compared to the McFadden version that is provided in 
the logistic model. Albeit that particular benefit associated with OLS estimations there are a number of 
potential risks, such as heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity, which must be controlled for in order for 
us to get an unbiased and reliable output. We test for heteroscedasticity by conducting White’s (1980) test 
and render results, which are shown in appendix 5, that provide us with the information that the data is 
homoscedastic, and therefore we may estimate the equation using ordinary standard errors. Following that 
we evaluate possible multicollinearity within our sample. The first step in doing so is to observe bivariate 
linear correlations between the independent variables. However, because the variables UNITS and 
                                                      
14 One issuer had its issuing costs paid by its main owner, second to smallest cost in the sample was 0.005. 
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STAND are binary, and therefore do not exhibit typical linear properties, we exclude those from this 
correlation matrix. Observing the correlations between the remaining variables, we find no values 
exceeding the threshold of 0.8 (Franke, 2010). In order to assess the binary variables potential impact on 
multicollinearity in the model we also study the variance inflation factors (VIF), which furthermore adds 
an additional aspect to the multicollinearity analysis as they depict the effect that each variable would have 
on its respective variance factor due to collinearity. Our findings show that none of the variables are 
associated with a VIF value that exceeds the acceptance range that is set at VIF>10 (Burns and Burns 
2008). Finally, we utilize Klein’s rule of thumb (Klein, 1962) by studying the auxiliary regressions and 
observing whether the explanatory factor (R2) in any of the outputs exceeds the value observed in the 
main model, where all variables are included. Because this method demands a comparison between the 
main models R2-value and auxiliary regressions’ R2-values, we chose to estimate all auxiliary regressions 
using ordinary least squares technique, independent of if the dependent variable is continuous or binary. 
By doing this, our results could deviate slightly from those that would have been found if we conducted 
the auxiliary regressions based on the optimal model for each dependent variable. Nevertheless in large, 
we assume that the results are similar and we instead focus on utilizing the optimal method for binary 
variables in the first main model of this study, the logistic model. Based on the above discussion, we 
however find that the results from the auxiliary regressions do not exhibit any signs that force us to 
believe that the overall model suffers from multicollinearity. The output from our estimations regarding 
bivariate correlations, VIF and auxiliary regressions can be found in appendix 6. 
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5.5 Cost of underwriting 
Subsequent to having estimated determinants of underwriting and floatation costs, as well as concluded 
that a rights issue paradox could be prevalent in the Swedish equity market, we initiate a third 
complementary model that estimates the cost of underwriting. The model serves as a complement to the 
studies conducted thus far in this thesis and could contribute to improved understanding to our results. 
Here, we are concerned with examining the relative share of standby remuneration, the cost of 
underwriting, relative to the gross proceeds. 
 
In this study, we have limited our sample to those issues that include standby underwriting, SEOs and 
IPOs. This restricts the number of observations to 403. Like the model for direct cost of floatation, we 
use a multivariate framework. We use variables from our preceding models and an additional independent 
variable. 
5.5.1 Variables 
To this model, an additional independent variable of interest is added, the natural logarithm number of 
standby underwriters in the offering, UWRITERS. We add this variable mainly for observational purposes 
and set no initial expectations on its outcome in the estimation. Arguably, larger numbers of underwriters 
could increase the underwriting cost, if the additional underwriter insures an additional amount of stock. 
Altınkılıc and Hansen’s (2000) found that firms requiring additional underwriter services incur higher costs 
in their offerings. However, the number of underwriters could also be independent of the proportion the 
fees make out of the gross proceeds, as different shareholder characteristics and underwriter 
characteristics may be prevalent. For example, a poorly diversified underwriter may require higher 
remuneration for its engagement, should he alone bear the burden of underwriting. On the contrary, a 
larger number of underwriters could split the risk and thus requiring less compensation. There exists to 
our knowledge no limitations regarding the underwritten share allocated to each underwriter.  
 
Again, we use PRO as an independent variable. On the one hand, we expect that firms with low gross 
proceeds, arguably smaller firms, to have higher costs associated with raising equity, such was the case in 
the estimation of direct floatation cost. Therefore, we believe the costs associated with utilising standby 
agreement to have a negative relationship with gross proceeds. On the other hand, smaller equity issues 
imply less committed capital for the underwriter, suggesting the coefficient to turn out negative. 
 
In order to fully capture the underwriters’ cost of commitment, we must include SPRE, subscription 
precommitments. Subscription precommitments should have a negative effect on the cost of underwriting 
since a greater expected shareholder takeup should be aligned with a lesser need of insurance of the 
offering.  
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Finally, we use ETI to see if economic sentiment has an effect on the cost of underwriting. Rationally, 
lower optimism or confidence in the economy could serve as an indicator of higher risk implied with 
equity offerings at the time of the issue. Therefore, we expect that this coefficient should be negative. 
However, a positive coefficient could indicate firms’ increasing willingness to compensate underwriters for 
their commitment in assuring firm quality, aligned with Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) and Booth and 
Smith’s (1986) arguments on certification and signalling. Descriptive statistics of the variables are provided 
in table 6 below. 
 
 Cost of underwriting UWRITERS PRO SPRE ETI 
 Mean  0.062  1.670  17.921  0.276  99.824 
 Median  0.055  1.792  17.631  0.260  102.033 
 Maximum  0.229  3.850  24.043  0.894  115.900 
 Minimum  0.002  0.000  15.405  0.000  69.367 
 Std. Dev.  0.041  1.048  1.404  0.214  11.035 
 Observations  407  407  407  407  407 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics covering variables included in the model cost of underwriting. The 
dependent variable is the costs associated with underwriting divided by the gross proceeds, while the 
number of underwriters (UWRITERS), log of issue proceeds (PRO), subscription precommitments 
(SPRE) and macroeconomic indicator (ETI) are explanatory variables.  
5.5.2 Model and execution 
The third main model of this thesis is specified below. 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑈𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 
Specification 3. Heckman sample selection model. 
This model is estimated using Heckmans’s (1979) sample selection model. The method, which involves a 
two-step procedure, implies is that the output derived from this estimation is conditioned on the first 
logistic model where we tested if the firm had made use of an underwriter. By applying this method, we 
correct for potential selection bias resulting from the common properties among the firms that make use 
of underwriters. 
In line with what was presented in the previous section regarding the first Direct cost of flotation model 
we conduct tests to identify potential issues resulting from multicollinearity. All findings15, irrespective of 
observing variance inflation factors, pairwise linear correlation or auxiliary regressions, show no sign of 
multicollinearity. Furthermore, we test for heteroscedasticity by applying White’s (1980) test and find that 
we have to reject the null hypothesis, therefore we conclude that the model suffers from 
heteroscedasticity. However, because the Heckman selection model is not compatible with robust 
standard errors we also compute an ordinary, unconditional estimation where we apply robust standard 
                                                      
15 Calculations can be found in appendix 7. 
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errors. This allows us to compare the results and determine if the heteroscedasticity found in the data has 
any impact on the results. The output from the test can be found in appendix 8. 
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6 Results and analysis 
The specification results are in the following section presented and analysed in accordance with previous 
sections. 
6.1 Logit model for the standby decision 
6.1.1 Results16 
The nature of the logistic model implies that the coefficients derived from the estimation should be 
transformed in order to ease interpretation. There are multiple ways in which the coefficient can be 
transformed, including odds ratios and marginal effects. We choose to transform our coefficients into 
marginal effects and in the formula we make use of the mean value ( 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 = ?̅? )of the respective variables. 
The formulas used to transform coefficient values into marginal effects can be found in appendix 10.  
 
Dep. var. 𝝰 SPRE PRIMEX UNITS LCKUP ETI 
Underwriter (0/1) 0,338* 0,216*** 0,103*** 0,129* -0,225*** -0,003* 
Significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1% 
 
Table 7. Results table: logistic model for the standby decision. Based on the output from the logistic 
model we calculate marginal effects, which are presented above. 
 
The marginal effects, which are shown at the means in the above table 7, point toward that several values, 
ceteris paribus, have a significant positive impact on the likelihood that an issuer employs an underwriter. 
Regarding subscription precommitments we can, given our sample, conclude that there is a positive 
relation between the variable and the propensity to make use of underwriters. Furthermore, firms that 
issue units show an increased likelihood of using underwriters, and the same positive effect, although not 
equally large, is seen among firms that are listed on the primary stock exchange. At the same time, we see 
that an issuer whose shareholders are engaged in a lockup agreements are less likely to engage in contracts 
with underwriters when issuing shares. Finally, the effect from the macro variable, provided through the 
economic tendency indicator, shows a negligible negative yet significant effect on the binary choice of 
using underwriters. 
6.1.2 Analysis 
The results of the model are partly consistent with our expectations, but also provide insight and support 
to existing theories. The coefficient for subscription precommitments is positive and significant at the 1 
per cent level of significance, indicating that an increase in precommitments leads to a higher probability 
that the firm also has chosen to make use of underwriters. The result is in contrast to our expectations 
                                                      
16 Complete output to be found in appendix 9. 
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and, if seen as a proxy for shareholder takeup, in contrast to conclusions on shareholder takeup in 
literature (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Ginglinger et al, 2013). Although, as mentioned previously, 
underwriting in Sweden is often conducted by large existing shareholders or blockholders, suggesting that 
larger precommitments could be indicating that firms with larger influential shareholders are more likely to 
assign themselves as underwriters, for convenience or as a result of other incentives, perhaps misaligned 
with that of other shareholders. However, a more likely conclusion could be that firms’ risk aversions 
correlates with subscription precommitments, and that risk averse firms tend to insure their offerings.  
 
The primary exchange is also positive and significant at the 1 per cent level and, because the variable is 
binary, we can easily interpret the effect it has on the likelihood of making use of underwriters. Here, we 
find that being listed on the primary exchange increases the probability with c. 10 per cent of using 
underwriters. Similar to SPRE, PRIMEX differ to our initial expectations but finds support in Heinkel 
and Schwartz’s (1986) theories o, suggesting that standby agreements to be means of signalling used by 
high quality firms. Firms that are listed on the primary exchange could be viewed as being of higher 
quality than that of the alternative lists based on accounting standards and improved liquidity. However, 
primary exchange listed firms, being more likely to insure their offerings, is divergent to Booth and 
Smith’s (1986) ideas of certification. This, since firms on the primary exchange arguably has lesser needs 
of certification. Of course, there could be reasons unobservable for this relationship as well, such as 
PRIMEX firms being owned by more risk averse shareholders, requiring insured rights issues, compared 
to peers on other markets.  
 
Units are positive and significant, at the 10 per cent significance level, increasing the probabilities of 
underwriting with c. 13 per cent. The result is aligned with our expectations and suggests that Byon and 
Moore’s (2003) findings of high volatility firms as issuers of units to be associated with firms having 
higher risk of offering failure, which in our study results in these firms insuring their offerings. Hence, we 
believe that firms issuing units have preferences for insuring their offerings due to higher implied risk of 
failure. 
 
Our expectations regarding lockups are in line with the results, and the coefficient is negative and also 
significant at the 1 per cent significance level. Suggesting that lockups serve as substitutes to underwriting 
for signalling purposes with regards to Brav and Gomper’s (2003) findings. Having a lockup agreement 
present among key management decreases, ceteris paribus, the probability of underwriting with c. 23 per 
cent. 
 
Finally, economic sentiment serves to explain little of the probability of utilising underwriters, with a 
coefficient size that is negligible in relation to the variable mean and media, which are around 100. 
However, the variable is negative and significant at the 10 per cent level, suggesting that economic 
sentiment is at least to be considered relevant in the choice of floatation method. Here, a positive outlook 
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should provide better confidence in the offering, thus experiencing a lesser need of insurance. 
Accordingly, an improved economic sentiment should increase the likelihood of wealth maximization.  
 
In conclusion, offerings including large subscription precommitments, offerings by firms listed on the 
primary exchange, and firms issuing units are more likely to result in standby underwriting, while lockups 
and beneficial economic sentiment decreases the likelihood of using standby underwriting. We argue that 
large subscription precommitments, combined with standby underwriting in the offering, could be a result 
of shareholders in the issuing firm being particularly risk averse, and thus favouring insuring the offering. 
However, we also regard this to be related to the dispersion of ownership among existing shareholders, 
with higher concentration of large shareholders leading to a greater individual influence on choice of 
floatation method. Accordingly, blockholders may perhaps have greater influence in signing up as 
underwriters themselves. This could further be a result of mere convenience in influential blockholders 
employing themselves in guaranteeing successful offerings. Yet, we cannot reject potential agency 
problems between blockholders and other shareholders as a cause in the decision of floatation method, 
since we lack qualitative information on this decision. Regarding the results related to theories of 
certification provided by underwriters, it is important to reiterate that Swedish underwriters are imperfect 
at delivering these services, but should not be underestimated due to their consequences of signalling from 
being insiders. The credibility underwrites have as superior investors is however difficult for us to observe, 
but should be of interest for further studies.  
 
6.2 Direct cost of floatation 
6.2.1 Results17 
Dep. var. 𝝰 PRO SPRE UNITS ETI STAND 
Direct cost 
of floatation 
0,384*** -0,016*** -0,040*** 0,012* -0,0003** 0,050*** 
[0,024] [0,001] [0,007] [0,007] [0,0001] [0,004] 
Significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%, [standard error] 
  
Table 8. Results table: direct cost of floatation 
The results from table 8 above show that all independent variables, no matter their respective direction, 
significantly contribute to explaining the cost of floatation. Among the factors that contribute positively to 
the cost of floatation, we find equity issuances where units are issued and we also find that the usage of 
standby underwriting tends to increase the cost of floatation, while issue proceeds and subscription 
precommitments take on negative values, thereby decreasing the cost of floatation. The explanatory ability 
of the model is also shown in the R2 value, which presents that approximately 45 per cent of the variation 
in the dependent variable, is explained by the chosen independent variables, and in addition to that the 
                                                      
17 Output table can be found in appendix 11. 
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overall F-statistic for the model reaches a level that allows us to reject its null hypothesis and thereby 
conclude that the independent variables all together contribute to the estimation of the cost of floatation.  
In the above data section, we show that several of the firms conduct multiple issues during our sample 
period, while others only conduct one. Usually multiple observations across one firm calls for an 
estimation method involving fixed effects as that allows the observer to focus on the within variation 
among the cross section objects. However, due to the panel being too unbalanced, fixed effects would 
lead to a massive exclusion of observations and the above estimation is therefore instead based on a 
pooled OLS method where we use standard errors that are robust to potential variance and covariance 
problems, such as cross-sectional correlation of the residuals. This implies that we can control for 
potential biases such as large t-statistics and too low p-values, in a similar way that fixed effects do, that in 
turn could result in improved findings derived from our estimations. Although, upon assuming that the 
data is structured in a good enough way to simulate a panel, we conduct an estimation and apply cross 
section fixed effects and get similar results as were found when estimating the pooled version. The main 
differences between the different outputs are that the economic indicator as well as the dummy variable 
representing the issuance of units become insignificant when using fixed effects while the R2 increases 
from 45 to approximately 85 per cent. Estimation output from the model where fixed effects are applied 
can be found in appendix 12.  
6.2.2 Analysis 
With complete results, analysis can be conducted for the study. The log gross proceeds coefficient is 
negative and significant at the 1 per cent significance level. This suggest that, like Eckbo and Masulis 
(1992) found, there exist economies of scale within stock issues and is therefore aligned with our initial 
expectations of the outcome. Aligned with Altınkılıc and Hansen’s (2000) findings, we assume that the 
financial advisor’s required remuneration is based on a percentage fee of the gross proceeds, and that 
larger proceeds by this assumption are more profitable.  
 
Subscription precommitments likewise support our initial expectations and that of shareholder takeup in 
existing literature (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Bohren et al, 1997; and Ginglinger et al, 2013). The 
coefficient is negative and significant at the 1 per cent level of significance. We assume that higher 
subscription precommitments is linked to less efforts made by the financial advisor in allocating shares, 
thus leading to lower compensation.  
 
With regards to the effort of the financial advisor in the stock issuance, in terms of generating and 
distributing instruments, the positive and significant UNITS coefficient suggests that financial advisors 
charge firms more from the extra work, as opposed to simply issuing common stock. Furthermore, it 
could also explain Byon and Moore’s (2003) findings that firms issuing units are associated with higher 
risks. Perhaps the financial advisor offsets their own posed risk of a failed transaction by charging higher 
costs. 
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The economic sentiment variable, ETI, while weak, is negative and significant. This is aligned with our 
expectations and suggests that firms offering equity are charged less in times of greater economic 
confidence or optimism. An improved measurement or indicator of sentiment specifically designated for 
the equity market could possibly help explain the variation in floatation cost more effectively.  
 
As expected, the most important independent variable, and moreover, also explaining the most cross 
sectional variation is the positive STAND variable, aligned with existing literature (Eckbo and Masulis, 
1992; Bohren et al, 1997; and Ginglinger et al, 2013).  
 
The positive coefficient of standby underwriting on direct floatation costs serves as the most important 
outcome of this regression. Here, the dummy variable standby results in 5 percentage points increase in 
direct floatation costs, which according to table 3 represent approximately half of the mean direct 
floatation cost. While an increasing underwriting cost is likely to be a logical outcome of underwriters 
providing additional services in the offering, a rights issue paradox cannot be discarded. Yet, we cannot 
ignore that the cost-benefits of using standby underwriting, compared to issuing rights, cannot be 
motivated by omitted factors in this study. For example, stock market performance post offering, as 
argued for by Parsons and Raviv (1985), could justify the use of underwriters. However, we do disregard 
Hansen’s (1988) transaction cost of trading rights as inconsistent in justifying the use of underwriting. We 
find the argument invalid since competition among online stockbrokers in Sweden during the time of the 
sample has led to decreasing costs of trading rights (Bolander, 2017), and yet standby underwriting has not 
decreased in popularity. In conclusion, while the study indicate higher direct costs in underwritten 
offerings, we can only determine that a rights offer paradox could be present, but cannot determine that 
uninsured rights issues comes at cheaper indirect prices. 
 
6.3 Cost of underwriting 
6.3.1 Results18  
 
Dep. var. 𝝰 UWRITERS PRO SPRE ETI 
Cost of underwriting 0.128*** 0.013*** -0.007*** -0.028** 0.0001 
 
[0.042] [0.002] [0.002] [0.013] [0.0003] 
Significance: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%, [standard error] 
  
Table 9. Results table: cost of underwriting. The results in the table are through the Heckman estimation 
conditioned upon the results from the first model.  
                                                      
18 Output tables can be found in appendix 13. 
 37 
The results in table 9 are based on the output from the Heckman estimation. In line with what was stated 
in the model description, an ordinary OLS estimation with robust standard errors has also been 
conducted. Because the results from those estimations do not differ significantly, we make the assumption 
that it is more important to correct for selection bias than for heteroscedasticity, and therefore the 
following interpretation and analysis of the results are based on the coefficient values in table 9.  
The model involves slightly fewer explanatory variables compared to our previous model, which may 
contribute to the fact that this model also has a slightly lower R2 value that reaches approximately 30 per 
cent rather than 45 per cent. In line this, the overall F-statistic is smaller albeit significant and we may 
therefore reject the null hypothesis and conclude that overall the explanatory variables contribute to 
determining the cost of underwriting.  
Having interpreted the overall fit of the model we can see that two independent variables, issue proceeds 
and subscription precommitments, have a negative impact on the cost of underwriting, while the 
coefficient for the number of underwriters, although it is infinitely small, has a positive impact on the cost. 
Finally, we see that the economic indicator is insignificant, and that the coefficient value in fact is smaller 
than its standard error, indicating that the coefficient is not separated from zero.  
In line with what was presented in the OLS model regarding panel data structure, we have also conducted 
the above estimation using cross sectional fixed effects. Unfortunately, the Heckman selection model is 
not compatible with cross section fixed effects, so the results, which are provided in appendix 14, may 
suffer from selection bias, however in line with the results from the White’s (1980) test we apply robust 
standard errors in this estimation. The overall results from the fixed effects model show that the 
coefficient estimates become smaller and less significant, which may be a consequence of fixed effects 
halving the sample size and thereby ignoring a majority of the variation that contributes to the results in 
the output presented in table 9 above. 
6.3.2 Analysis 
The coefficient of the constant shows a positive value at a 1 per cent significance level, thereby indicating 
that there is a fixed cost associated with engaging underwriters in an equity issuance, and furthermore, the 
number of underwriters is positive and equally significant. This suggests that the cost of underwriting is 
increasing in the involved parties. We argue that this is a result of riskier firms, that have higher risk of 
offer failure, incur higher costs of underwriting and have improved access to underwriting when the 
underwritten amount is borne by many underwriters. This is supported by the idea that financial advisors 
charge extra for risky firms issuing units, as found in our model estimating direct floatation costs. As a 
final note regarding this variable, we realize that the coefficient value is infinitely small relative the 
variables standard deviation being approximately 1, while at the same time noting that the direction is 
negative and therefore concluding that a qualitative survey to financial advisors could help explain the 
phenomenon. 
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Gross proceeds is negative and significant at the 1 per cent level, suggesting that the cost of underwriting 
is aligned with our initial expectations, namely that there are economies of scale in the services provided 
by underwriters, as well as larger firms having to pay less for underwriting. If higher gross proceeds are 
associated with larger firms of higher liquidity in the stock, then the underwriter would effectively take on 
less risk in this dimension, perhaps serving as an explanation to its remuneration. 
 
The coefficient for subscription precommitments, arguably the most accurate measure of expected takeup, 
is negative and significant. This is completely aligned with our expectations and suggests that the standby 
underwriters are considering risk of offer failure before providing their insurance services. However, the 
observed effect can also be explained by the issuing firm’s behaviour. If assuming that the firm aims to 
maximize its proceeds from the issuance, they should have an incentive to first gain as much 
precommitments as possible before engaging in contracts with underwriters. Therefore, these firms have 
lower risk of offer failure, which accordingly leads to lower costs of underwriting in addition to requiring 
less insurance.  
 
The ETI coefficient is positive, yet negligible in its intensity, but insignificant.  Therefore, no analysis is 
conducted for the outcome.  
 
The multivariate framework for explaining the cost of underwriting, as a measure of underwriting cost 
relative to gross proceeds, serve to further explain the dynamics of standby underwriting in equity 
offerings. The increasing probability in using underwriting with higher subscription precommitments, as 
found in the logit model, can be explained by the decreasing cost of underwriting with subscription 
precommitments. We believe that the opportunity cost for insuring an equity issue decreases with 
subscription precommitments, that is, offerings with already large precommitments incur less costs to fully 
insure an offering than do firms with less precommitments. 
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7 Conclusion 
This thesis extends on the existing literature on determinants of underwriting and the rights issue paradox. 
Our research focuses on explaining the aforementioned issues by using data extracted from all equity 
offerings prospectuses in Sweden during 2006-2017 while also observing the prevailing economic 
sentiment during the time of the equity offering. Firstly, we use a logistic model to estimate the 
determinants of underwriting. Our findings are generally aligned with existing theories, but also exhibit 
important differences. We find that high quality firms use underwriting as a signalling mechanism, which 
is aligned with Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) theories. As a result, it is illogical to call Swedish underwriters 
in issues on the primary exchange certification providers, but should rather be viewed as insider investors 
signalling firm quality through their implied willingness to invest. However, since issuing units is also 
increasing the probability of underwriting, Booth and Smith’s (1986) theory of certification cannot be 
disregarded for firms of this character. Nonetheless, we believe that issuers of units use standby 
underwriting for its benefit from insurance purposes rather than effect from certification or signalling. 
Moreover, our study finds a negative relationship between issuing uninsured rights and higher expected 
takeup, which is in contradiction to prevailing theories and findings (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Bohren et 
al, 1997; and Ginglinger et al, 2013). Our explanation for this outcome is bilateral. On the one hand, we 
believe that firms governed by shareholders possessing risk aversion will improve the probability of 
success of the offering by using both subscription precommitments and standby underwriting. On the 
other hand, large subscription precommitments may indicate concentrated ownership, which could result 
in higher levels of underwriting based on an existing agency problem between different shareholders. 
Secondly, we find in our model for direct cost of floatation that standby agreements are statistically 
significant in explaining increased costs. The results are largely consistent with existing literature on 
international settings for domestic equity markets (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Bohren et al, 1997; 
Ginglinger et al, 2013) and suggest that a rights issue paradox could be prevalent on the Swedish equity 
market too. The result calls for further research to investigate the indirect costs of floatation in order to 
completely determine if firms are acting in divergence to wealth-maximizing decision making in equity 
offerings. Thirdly, we estimate the cost of underwriting and find that there exists economies of scale 
among underwriters and that the cost of underwriting increases with additional underwriters. The cost of 
underwriting decreases with subscription precommitments, suggesting that the initial results from the 
standby decision are further explained by underwriting becoming more economically attainable as 
subscription precommitments increase. Future studies could include firm specific variables symbolising 
firm specific risk as well as improved measures of shareholder takeup, as well as seek to estimate the 
implied status of underwriters as investors. Furthermore, qualitative studies, surveying decision makers in 
equity offerings, could shed some light on the decision of floatation method and the implied role of 
underwriters as providers of signalling and certification. In addition, particular focus could be brought to 
agency problems between shareholders, as this would widen the theoretical scope from managers and 
shareholders.  
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9 Appendix 
 
A.1: Transformation of equation 
 
Transforming a linear equation that can be estimated with ordinary least squares to an equation that can 
be estimated using the logistic method 
 
𝑦 =  𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘       (1) 
 
𝑝
(1−𝑝)
= exp(𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘)     (2) 
 
ln (
𝑝
1−𝑝
) = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘     (3) 
 
𝑝 =  
1
1+𝑒−(𝛽𝑜+𝛽1𝑥1+⋯+𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘)
      (4) 
 
 
 
 
Illustrating the difference between the dependent variable in a linear and logistic regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.2: Augmented Dickey Fuller test  
 
Null Hypothesis: ETI has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, max. lag=19) 
     
     
   t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -24.49365 0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.439437  
 5% level  -2.865441  
 10% level  -2.568904  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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A.3: Detecting potential multicollinearity in logistic model 
 
Bivariate correlation between regressors in logistic model (excluding binary regressors) 
 
Correlation  
Probability ETI SPRE 
ETI 1.000000  
 n/a  
   
SPRE -0.050610 1.000000 
 0.1801 n/a 
 
 
VIF: logit model (estimated as part of a OLS model) 
 
Variable Coefficient variance Centered VIF 
   
C 0.030123 NA 
SPRE 0.004998 1.022542 
PRIMEX 0.001578 1.059297 
UNITS 0.004490 1.032037 
LCKUP 0.001589 1.048724 
ETI 2.83E-06 1.029314 
   
 
A.4: Goodness of fit test for logistic model 
 
 
Expectation-Prediction Evaluation for Binary Specification 
Equation: LOG     
Success cut-off: C = 0.5    
       
       
 Estimated Equation Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
       
       
P(Dep=1)<=C 107 63 170 0 0 0 
P(Dep=1)>C 189 344 533 296 407 703 
Total 296 407 703 296 407 703 
Correct 107 344 451 0 407 407 
% Correct 36.15 84.52 64.15 0.00 100.00 57.89 
% Incorrect 63.85 15.48 35.85 100.00 0.00 42.11 
Total Gain* 36.15 -15.48 6.26    
Percent Gain** 36.15 NA 14.86    
              
 Estimated Equation Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
       
       
E(# of Dep=0) 137.54 158.46 296.00 124.63 171.37 296.00 
E(# of Dep=1) 158.46 248.54 407.00 171.37 235.63 407.00 
Total 296.00 407.00 703.00 296.00 407.00 703.00 
Correct 137.54 248.54 386.07 124.63 235.63 360.26 
% Correct 46.46 61.07 54.92 42.11 57.89 51.25 
% Incorrect 53.54 38.93 45.08 57.89 42.11 48.75 
Total Gain* 4.36 3.17 3.67    
Percent Gain** 7.53 7.53 7.53    
              
*Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification 
**Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation 
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A.5: Heteroscedasticity detection  
 
This table reports results derived from White’s test which was conducted on the estimation where the 
direct cost of floatation was measured. The insignificant F-statistic indicates that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity. 
 
F-statistic 1.152530 Prob. F(18,498) 0.2975 
Obs*R-squared 20.67573 Prob. Chi-Square(18) 0.2961 
Scaled explained SS 48.83073 Prob. Chi-Square(18) 0.0001 
 
 
 
A.6: Detecting multicollinearity in the model Direct cost of floatation 
 
Bivariate correlations between regressors in model direct cost of floatation (excluding binary regressors) 
 
Sample/ included observations: 517/517 
    
    
Correlation   
Probability SPRE ETI PRO 
SPRE 1.000000   
 n/a   
    
ETI -0.021546 1.000000  
 0.6250 n/a  
    
PRO 0.182434 -0.022755 1.000000 
 0.0000 0.6057 n/a 
    
    
 
Variance inflation factors for variables in the estimation regarding direct cost of floatation. All 517 
observations are included. 
 
Variable Coefficient variance Centered VIF 
   
   
C 0.000680 NA 
SPRE 5.02E-05 1.037157 
UNITS 3.86E-05 1.039210 
STAND 1.41E-05 1.009055 
ETI 2.14E-08 1.006803 
PRO 1.41E-06 1.066928 
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Auxiliary regressions 
 
(1/5) 
Dependent Variable: SPRE  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample/ included observations: 517/517   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.210317 0.158328 -1.328361 0.1847 
UNITS -0.035683 0.037393 -0.954273 0.3404 
STAND 0.014852 0.027644 0.537254 0.5913 
ETI -0.000429 0.000902 -0.475405 0.6347 
PRO 0.028624 0.007308 3.917079 0.0001 
          
R-squared 0.035826    Mean dependent var 0.266952 
Adjusted R-squared 0.028293    S.D. dependent var 0.244638 
S.E. of regression 0.241153    Akaike info criterion 0.002852 
Sum squared resid 29.77520    Schwarz criterion 0.043936 
Log likelihood 4.262657    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.018950 
F-statistic 4.756113    Durbin-Watson stat 1.966244 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000894    Wald F-statistic 5.220411 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000397    
 
 
 
 
(2/5) 
Dependent Variable: UNITS   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample/ included observations: 517/517 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.805087 0.176704 4.556136 0.0000 
STAND 0.035257 0.025056 1.407154 0.1600 
ETI -0.001814 0.001136 -1.597010 0.1109 
PRO -0.030857 0.006228 -4.954703 0.0000 
SPRE -0.046422 0.049131 -0.944862 0.3452 
          
R-squared 0.037731    Mean dependent var 0.085106 
Adjusted R-squared 0.030213    S.D. dependent var 0.279310 
S.E. of regression 0.275058    Akaike info criterion 0.265958 
Sum squared resid 38.73647    Schwarz criterion 0.307042 
Log likelihood -63.75014    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.282056 
F-statistic 5.018868    Durbin-Watson stat 2.099043 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000565    Wald F-statistic 7.187293 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000012    
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 (3/5) 
Dependent Variable: STAND   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample/ included observations: 517/517 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.252367 0.331726 0.760769 0.4471 
ETI 0.000188 0.001764 0.106368 0.9153 
PRO 0.023049 0.014241 1.618498 0.1062 
SPRE 0.053047 0.100318 0.528785 0.5972 
UNITS 0.096796 0.067393 1.436302 0.1515 
          
R-squared 0.008974    Mean dependent var 0.705996 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001231    S.D. dependent var 0.456035 
S.E. of regression 0.455754    Akaike info criterion 1.275897 
Sum squared resid 106.3484    Schwarz criterion 1.316981 
Log likelihood -324.8195    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.291995 
F-statistic 1.159020    Durbin-Watson stat 1.876086 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.328072    Wald F-statistic 1.089162 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.361117    
 
 
(4/5) 
Dependent Variable: ETI   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample/ included observations: 517/517 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 104.2662 7.539173 13.82992 0.0000 
PRO -0.253531 0.410962 -0.616921 0.5376 
SPRE -1.005301 2.112395 -0.475906 0.6343 
UNITS -3.268687 2.002989 -1.631905 0.1033 
STAND 0.123128 1.158198 0.106310 0.9154 
          
R-squared 0.006757    Mean dependent var 99.26809 
Adjusted R-squared -0.001003    S.D. dependent var 11.66885 
S.E. of regression 11.67470    Akaike info criterion 7.762349 
Sum squared resid 69784.89    Schwarz criterion 7.803433 
Log likelihood -2001.567    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.778447 
F-statistic 0.870737    Durbin-Watson stat 1.872395 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.481243    Wald F-statistic 0.747922 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.559701    
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 (5/5) 
Dependent Variable: PRO   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample/ included observations: 517/517 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 17.92086 0.635939 28.18018 0.0000 
SPRE 1.019860 0.259570 3.929035 0.0001 
UNITS -0.845074 0.136780 -6.178350 0.0000 
STAND 0.229926 0.143894 1.597891 0.1107 
ETI -0.003854 0.006333 -0.608609 0.5431 
          
R-squared 0.062729    Mean dependent var 17.90093 
Adjusted R-squared 0.055407    S.D. dependent var 1.481063 
S.E. of regression 1.439448    Akaike info criterion 3.576020 
Sum squared resid 1060.869    Schwarz criterion 3.617104 
Log likelihood -919.4012    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.592118 
F-statistic 8.566764    Durbin-Watson stat 0.131700 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    Wald F-statistic 15.45036 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
A.7: Detecting multicollinearity in the model Cost of underwriting  
 
Variance inflation factors for the response equations variables in the Heckman selection model 
Variable  Coefficient Variance Centered VIF 
   
C 0.001776 NA 
SPRE 0.000165 1.021790 
PRO 2.82E-06 1.013937 
ETI 8.66E-08 1.010762 
UWRITERS 2.86E-06 1.012296 
 
Bivariate correlations: cost of underwriting 
 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary   
Sample/included observations: 407/407 
     
Correlation    
Probability SPRE PRO ETI UWRITERS 
SPRE 1.000000    
 n/a    
     
PRO 0.105431 1.000000   
 0.0335 n/a   
     
ETI -0.037017 -0.123454 1.000000  
 0.4564 0.0127 n/a  
     
UWRITERS -0.178366 -0.070616 0.018223 1.000000 
 0.0003 0.1550 0.7140 n/a 
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Auxiliary regressions 
 
(1/4) 
Dependent Variable: SPRE  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 407    
Included observations: 407   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.178427 0.185121 0.963838 0.3357 
PRO 0.012426 0.007176 1.731563 0.0841 
ETI -0.000612 0.000975 -0.627671 0.5306 
UWRITERS -0.038143 0.011077 -3.443365 0.0006 
          
R-squared 0.046128    Mean dependent var 0.276296 
Adjusted R-squared 0.039027    S.D. dependent var 0.214031 
S.E. of regression 0.209813    Akaike info criterion -0.275423 
Sum squared resid 17.74063    Schwarz criterion -0.236024 
Log likelihood 60.04849    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.259831 
F-statistic 6.496141    Durbin-Watson stat 2.048611 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000266    Wald F-statistic 6.460807 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000279    
 
 
 
(2/4) 
Dependent Variable: PRO   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample/ included observations: 407/407    
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 19.54089 0.816426 23.93467 0.0000 
ETI -0.015613 0.007998 -1.951981 0.0516 
UWRITERS -0.126206 0.067391 -1.872738 0.0618 
SPRE 0.541390 0.307909 1.758279 0.0795 
          
R-squared 0.033959    Mean dependent var 17.92116 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026767    S.D. dependent var 1.403813 
S.E. of regression 1.384897    Akaike info criterion 3.498908 
Sum squared resid 772.9299    Schwarz criterion 3.538307 
Log likelihood -708.0278    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.514500 
F-statistic 4.722136    Durbin-Watson stat 1.650872 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.002988    Wald F-statistic 3.640711 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.012917    
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(3/4) 
Dependent Variable: ETI   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample/ included observations: 407/407    
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 118.6464 8.690323 13.65270 0.0000 
UWRITERS -0.467442 0.532016 -0.878623 0.3801 
SPRE -1.675845 2.667374 -0.628275 0.5302 
PRO -0.980894 0.475492 -2.062902 0.0398 
          
R-squared 0.017704    Mean dependent var 99.82387 
Adjusted R-squared 0.010392    S.D. dependent var 11.03464 
S.E. of regression 10.97715    Akaike info criterion 7.639288 
Sum squared resid 48560.63    Schwarz criterion 7.678687 
Log likelihood -1550.595    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.654880 
F-statistic 2.421154    Durbin-Watson stat 0.036042 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.065564    Wald F-statistic 1.651867 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.176884    
 
 
(4/4) 
Dependent Variable: UWRITERS   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample/ included observations: 407/407    
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 3.573735 0.846826 4.220151 0.0000 
SPRE -0.913271 0.260024 -3.512256 0.0005 
PRO -0.069358 0.036200 -1.915958 0.0561 
ETI -0.004089 0.004669 -0.875766 0.3817 
          
R-squared 0.047348    Mean dependent var 1.670253 
Adjusted R-squared 0.040256    S.D. dependent var 1.047970 
S.E. of regression 1.026660    Akaike info criterion 2.900278 
Sum squared resid 424.7742    Schwarz criterion 2.939676 
Log likelihood -586.2065    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.915869 
F-statistic 6.676502    Durbin-Watson stat 1.925416 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000208    Wald F-statistic 5.871803 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000624    
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A.8: White’s test applied on the model for Cost of underwriting 
 
This table shows the results from the White’s test which has been conducted on the model where we 
estimate the cost of underwriting. The null hypothesis of the White’s test implies homoscedasticity, and 
therefore a rejected null hypothesis, as in this case, implies heteroscedasticity if assuming a 95% 
confidence level.  
F-statistic 2.598984 Prob. F(14,392) 0.0013 
Obs*R-squared 34.56933 Prob. Chi-Square(14) 0.0017 
Scaled explained SS 51.54365 Prob. Chi-Square(14) 0.0000 
 
A.9 : Output table from logistic regression  
 
Dependent Variable: STAND   
Method: ML - Binary Logit  (Newton-Raphson / Marquardt steps) 
Date: 07/27/17   Time: 10:35   
Sample: 1 703    
Included observations: 703   
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations  
Coefficient covariance computed using observed Hessian 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
     
     
C 1.505285 0.785422 1.916530 0.0553 
SPRE 0.960266 0.320256 2.998431 0.0027 
PRIMEX 0.460042 0.178439 2.578144 0.0099 
UNITS 0.576725 0.311224 1.853085 0.0639 
LCKUP -1.002745 0.176411 -5.684130 0.0000 
ETI -0.012831 0.007595 -1.689369 0.0911 
          
McFadden R-squared 0.055170 Mean dependent var 0.578947 
S.D. dependent var 0.494080 S.E. of regression 0.476306 
Akaike info criterion 1.303228 Sum squared resid 158.1266 
Schwarz criterion 1.342107 Log likelihood -452.0846 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.318254 Deviance 904.1692 
Restr. deviance 956.9651 Restr. log likelihood -478.4825 
LR statistic 52.79590 Avg. log likelihood -0.643079 
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Obs with Dep=0 296 Total obs 703 
Obs with Dep=1 407    
     
 
 
A.10: Steps involved in calculating marginal effects  
 
𝑧̅ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1?̅?1 + 𝛽2?̅?2 + 𝛽3?̅?3 + 𝛽4?̅?4 + 𝛽5?̅?5 + 𝛽6?̅?6    (1) 
 
𝐹(𝑧̅) =
1
1+exp(−𝑧̅)
         (2) 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑘
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝐹(𝑧)(1 − 𝐹(𝑧)), where 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 6}    (3) 
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A.11: Output table for estimation Direct cost of floatation 
 
Dependent Variable: Direct cost of floatation  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 517    
Included observations: 517   
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     
C 0.383917 0.026068 14.72724 0.0000 
SPRE -0.039891 0.007089 -5.627441 0.0000 
UNITS 0.011578 0.006215 1.862981 0.0630 
STAND 0.049601 0.003751 13.22403 0.0000 
ETI -0.000315 0.000146 -2.150395 0.0320 
PRO -0.016114 0.001188 -13.56924 0.0000 
          
R-squared 0.452708 Mean dependent var 0.089552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.447353 S.D. dependent var 0.052032 
S.E. of regression 0.038680 Akaike info criterion -3.655433 
Sum squared resid 0.764542 Schwarz criterion -3.606133 
Log likelihood 950.9294 Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.636115 
F-statistic 84.53765 Durbin-Watson stat 2.020200 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
A.12: Estimation of Direct cost of floatation with cross-section fixed effects  
 
Dependent Variable: Direct cost of floatation  
Method: Panel Least Squares (with cross-section fixed effects)  
Sample: 1 517    
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 280   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 517  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     
C 0.444831 0.063765 6.976103 0.0000 
SPRE -0.024896 0.010338 -2.408129 0.0168 
UNITS 0.009897 0.007427 1.332531 0.1840 
STAND 0.044012 0.005347 8.231422 0.0000 
ETI -9.92E-05 0.000170 -0.585225 0.5590 
PRO -0.020708 0.003620 -5.721188 0.0000 
     
R-squared 0.838342 Mean dependent var 0.089552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.640451 S.D. dependent var 0.052032 
S.E. of regression 0.031199 Akaike info criterion -3.795630 
Sum squared resid 0.225829 Schwarz criterion -1.453866 
Log likelihood 1266.170 Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.878042 
F-statistic 4.236375 Durbin-Watson stat 3.948274 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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A.13: Estimation output Cost of underwriting  
 
Results from Heckman’s two step correction model. Note that the coefficients in the selection equation 
(i.e. the model estimated using the logit method) differ slightly from the coefficients presented above, due 
to differing estimation methods. The analysis of the logit results are based on the output in appendix 6. 
 
Two-Step Heckman Selection  
Sample/ included observations: 703/703    
Selection Variable: Underwriter (0/1)   
Coefficient covariance computed using  two-step Heckman method 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     
Response Equation – Cost of underwriting 
     
     
C 0.128295 0.042144 3.044175 0.0024 
SPRE -0.027849 0.012835 -2.169835 0.0304 
PRO -0.006997 0.001680 -4.164336 0.0000 
ETI 0.000135 0.000294 0.459783 0.6458 
UWRITERS 0.013283 0.001692 7.851102 0.0000 
          
Selection Equation - Underwritten 
     
     
C 0.929467 0.472817 1.965806 0.0497 
SPRE 0.550726 0.187466 2.937738 0.0034 
PRIMEX 0.277759 0.108512 2.559696 0.0107 
UNITS 0.352014 0.186437 1.888113 0.0594 
LCKUP -0.614179 0.107484 -5.714156 0.0000 
ETI -0.007828 0.004586 -1.706906 0.0883 
          
Mean dependent var 0.062491 S.D. dependent var 0.041267 
S.E. of regression 0.036089 Akaike info criterion 2.407580 
Sum squared resid 0.898692 Schwarz criterion 2.478859 
Log likelihood -835.2644 Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.435128 
 
Output table for model where cost of underwriting is estimated using robust standard errors   
 
Dependent Variable: Cost of underwriting  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample/ included observations: 407/407 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     
C 0.133588 0.025960 5.145892 0.0000 
SPRE -0.036559 0.008575 -4.263435 0.0000 
PRO -0.007074 0.001073 -6.590718 0.0000 
ETI 0.000422 0.000127 3.335480 0.0009 
UWRITERS 0.014142 0.001692 8.357293 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.296546 Mean dependent var 0.062491 
Adjusted R-squared 0.289546 S.D. dependent var 0.041267 
S.E. of regression 0.034783 Akaike info criterion -3.867172 
Sum squared resid 0.486360 Schwarz criterion -3.817924 
Log likelihood 791.9695 Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.847682 
F-statistic 42.36643 Durbin-Watson stat 1.181469 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 Wald F-statistic 47.85688 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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A.14: Estimating cost of underwriting using fixed effects 
 
Dependent Variable: Cost of underwriting   
Method: Panel Least Squares (with cross-section fixed effects)  
Sample: 1 407    
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 243   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 407  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     
C -0.093822 0.095362 -0.983850 0.3267 
SPRE -0.023049 0.009956 -2.315168 0.0219 
PRO 0.007442 0.005479 1.358285 0.1763 
ETI 0.000225 7.71E-05 2.925199 0.0039 
UWRITERS 0.004070 0.004107 0.991189 0.3231 
     
R-squared 0.802641 Mean dependent var 0.062491 
Adjusted R-squared 0.499202 S.D. dependent var 0.041267 
S.E. of regression 0.029203 Akaike info criterion -3.948962 
Sum squared resid 0.136452 Schwarz criterion -1.516095 
Log likelihood 1050.614 Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.986175 
F-statistic 2.645145 Durbin-Watson stat 3.937112 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
